JANUARY 02, 2017

By Arjun Banerjee, IRS

"THE sum total effect of America's involvement in Mesopotamia and in Afghanistan has been to fast-forward the arrival of the Asian century," observed Robert Kaplan. By the Asian century, Kaplan refers not only to the Asian economic might, which started with the Tiger economies of the Pacific Rim in the late 1970s and early 1980s but of burgeoning military prowess and post-industrial civil military complexes of several Asian nations. As economies have grown for decades on end throughout world history, militaries have grown as well. This is because as nations start to trade more with the outside world, concomitantly with their growing economies, they develop far-flung interests that lead them to simultaneously militarize to secure those interests.

There is, however, a flipside to the coin of burgeoning economies. Increasing economic prowess and maritime trade leads to not only greater development, but it makes for great fishing grounds for pirates, who wish to make quick money, themselves coming from deprived, stagnant littoral economies without other means of sustenance. However, far more hazardous is when the threat of maritime terrorism takes the form of a seemingly regular pirate attack, albeit with far more devastating consequences. The targets and methods used by pirates will vary from those chosen by terrorists. Unlike pirates, maritime terrorists target vessels that will have some impact on the political objective they are trying to achieve.

Though the United Nations (UN) serves as the representative body for international peace and stability, it has failed to offer a satisfactory definition for either piracy or terrorism. For example, piracy is defined by the UN in Article 101 of its Convention on the Law of the Sea as an act of violence or robbery undertaken for private ends against another ship or person in the high seas. This definition is ambiguous and restricts how states may pursue piratical instances with respect to international law.

Not having a universal definition for terrorism is problematic in itself, but it becomes more difficult when states must distinguish between piracy, terrorism, and other acts of maritime depredation. There are two organizations, however; the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) and the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), that offer noteworthy definitions for piracy and maritime terrorism. The IMB defines piracy as "an act of boarding or attempting to board any ship with the apparent intent to commit theft or any other crime and with the apparent intent or capability to use force in furtherance of that act." The CSCAP defines maritime terrorism as "the undertaking of terrorist acts and activities (1) within the maritime environment, (2) using or against vessels or fixed platforms at sea or in port, or against any one of their passengers or personnel, (3) against coastal facilities or settlements, including tourist resorts, port areas and port towns or cities." Combining these definitions with the motivations, methods, and targets of terrorists and pirates operating at sea allows us to discern maritime terrorism from piracy.

The terror attacks of September 11, 2001, changed a great deal in the world, and even in the maritime world. A real threat to shipping worldwide became an increasingly significant topic. Subsequently, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) has adopted certain mandatory security measures. The monitoring of containers during loading and along the entire transport chain, has been taken to its extreme by the United States, Singapore, and the United Arab Emirates, for example, as just a single breach of security may compromise the entire shipping and logistics chain. The major trading partners of the United States must also comply with these measures to reduce chances of problems with importing container traffic, nationally and internationally. These measures aim to prevent terrorists at sea from acquiring weapons and materials supplies, and simultaneously, to avoid ships from being hijacked and used as weapons – similar to the hijacked aircraft from the September 11 attacks.

The maritime domain poses a security concern and is particularly vulnerable to terrorist attacks because it is largely ungoverned and its ports are inherently difficult to secure. Smaller ports and vessels have received little focus and they often escape attention of national authorities. A full analysis of the overall costs and gains of the security measures is still to be carried out. Trafficking of nuclear or radiological materials in the Eastern-Indian Ocean Region (E-IOR) may seem unlikely considering the difficulties involved in acquiring fissile material, or more so, an intact nuclear weapon. That could be true to a large extent, but we need only one incident to shake the world, as exemplified by the September 11 attacks. When al-Qaeda used commercial airliners to commit these atrocities it became apparent that terrorists are capable of using unconventional means to exploit any potential weakness in a state's security.

Recent suggestions that a nexus may be forming between pirates and terrorists add further complexity to understanding the differences between these two groups. Terrorists often are under-skilled when it comes to conducting maritime attacks. Maritime terrorism requires experience and training in the dynamic aquatic environment in areas such as navigation and ship handling. There are, however, various ways that this handicap can be overcome by terrorists. They could receive training from adept seafaring pirates. Or pirates could assist them by navigating to the target site on their behalf. Pirates could benefit in terms of monetary rewards or arms from terrorists in return for services rendered. Further, terrorists could aid pirates with safe passage when on shore. Thus, there are some reciprocal benefits for these groups to partner with one another. Terrorists could be more comfortable in trafficking materials of concern via water with training or pirate aid. Additionally, terrorists sometimes do conduct operations at sea for a financial reward. For example, the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) is a Philippine terrorist organization that has used its maritime abilities to attack ships mainly for financial purposes.

No stone can be left unturned to design and implement robust anti-maritime terror possible defence mechanisms. There is absolutely no margin for error, for chinks in the armour, or for leaving an Achilles' heel exposed in the raging battle against terror. The plan must be chalked out at multiple levels, from the grassroots and most local to international.

Educating small vessel stakeholders about E-IOR maritime security is important. This would comprise providing national fora for small vessel stakeholders and government officials to brainstorm and exchange ideas on countering small vessel threats in the maritime domain and prepare a report for public, industry, and government to work together on national-level decisions which would effectively detect, deter and defeat small vessel threats in the E-IOR.

It is instrumental to develop a strong partnership with the small vessel community, the public and the private sectors in order to bolster maritime domain awareness; use a layered and innovative approach to empower organizations dealing with maritime security; leverage current technologies to neutralize small vessel threats; and put into place an effective "3C approach" of better communication, cooperation, and coordination between all maritime security stakeholders in a country, the private sector and international partners on radiological and nuclear detection and interdiction; and explore research and development of a permanent sensor system to detect and track non-cooperative vessels. Further, when it comes to Radioactive Portal Monitors (RPMs), cost-sharing arrangements could be made whereby the government of the concerned country and port operators would share the cost of extra portal monitor deployments.

The following are a few suggestions, none of which are foolproof as standalone, but each one can be imagined as a strand of thread in a spider web, that helps weave a complete and effective security system to apprehend smugglers in time:

1.   "Neighbourhood Watch": An important factor that could be an impediment to the effective functioning of a coastal security architecture is the discontent among fishermen. The fisher-folk and other coastal locals can be the "eyes and ears" at the grassroots level of the coastal security architecture, and, therefore, an integral part of the overall effectiveness of the system. Keeping the fishermen happy and cultivating them for the same purpose is of the essence. A good example is that of the fishermen groups in India, christened SagarSuraksha Dal (a loose translation in English would be Sea Security Force), comprising of trained volunteers who monitor the seas and coastal waters, share information about any suspicious activities or vessels at sea with security and law enforcement agencies, and also participate in coastal security exercises conducted by the ICG. They must be incentivized in one way or another, even if that means something as seemingly small (but important to them) as providing phone credits or data for participation.

By extension, state authorities should increase awareness among folks about what measures have been adopted in the maritime security domain, which agencies are involved in monitoring security systems without giving out the most sensitive information. Apart from likely countering the threat of trafficking of radiological and nuclear materials, this system is almost like a panacea against any kind of illegal foreign intrusion and resultant illicit trade in narcotics, human trafficking, Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), and so on.

3.  Increase Coordination: The number of agencies working in the same domain should be reduced to a bare essential. Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) are required to be formulated between all responsible agencies to achieve an optimum level of coordination for coordinated patrol and the conducting of combined operations. Joint coastal security exercises involving all the maritime stakeholders should be regularly conducted in all the coastal states nationally and in multi-national partnerships as well.                                       
4.  Increase Manpower and Resource Allocation: The shortage of manpower and adequate technology is directly proportional to lack of resources. Countries having insufficient funds for such programs either need aid to have good defence systems in place or channel funds towards maritime security programs when they are able. Schemes to recruit newly retired Navy, Customs, or Coast Guard personnel may alleviate the problem.                                    

5.  Improve Training: An insufficient number of trained personnel adept at sea patrolling and maritime combat operations is yet another problem that plagues some countries. Training should be more in sync with world events and the responsibilities entrusted upon officials.

6.  Regular Patrols: Difficult terrain, seasonal weather patterns, administrative lapses and other issues all contribute towards introducing gaps in surveillance and monitoring mechanisms. One of the areas along the Indo-Bangladesh coast, and a good example of this kind of a problem are the Sunderbans. It is a daunting challenge to check the entire area at all times. However, regular patrolling along its whole stretch is must, come rain or shine, supported by regulations that allow them to do so.                                          

7. More and Comprehensive Research: It is crucial to gauge the problem in its entirety and ascertain possibilities of proliferation of nuclear or radiological material from source point to end point. That is, from where they could be manufactured or acquired by terrorists, to putting checks on how they can possibly be shipped, whether using containers or using small vessels harder to track, and by paying attention to those countries which may be seeking such material.

8.  Comprehensive Policy for Maritime Security: This requires interest at the upper echelons of government. Once there is a legislative backing for a comprehensive maritime security system, it is far easier to construct it in a nation. Current regulations and legislations in most E-IOR countries do not address the threat of radiological and nuclear weapons.

Following some or all of these suggestions could possibly provide a much-needed denouement, and greatly reduce chances of a nuclear or radiological attack causing death and destruction, the kind which mankind cannot afford. There needs to be the strictest controls in place and security agencies of every nation fighting this scourge must compulsorily be highly vigilant for any indicators of trafficking of such devastating material. Hopefully can we then look forward to a bright, safe, and prosperous future for all in the IOR and, by extension, in the rest of the world.

(The author is Assistant Commissioner, (Customs & Central Excise), New Delhi & Export Control Visiting Fellow, Dept. of Energy, USA. This article is a condensed version of a longer one with the same title. )